This is a browser simulation. Synthetic actor labels and seeded events drive JavaScript functions that mutate an in-memory calendar, CRM, payments ledger, and message outbox. No autonomous agent, external tool, customer system, or external system of record runs on this page. The receipt-chain mechanics are real: WebCrypto computes SHA-256 hashes in your browser so you can verify, tamper with, export, and replay the synthetic record.
The agent stack already works — a voice or process-automation platform takes intents and drives tools: scheduling, CRM, payments, messaging. What's missing is not capability. It's admissibility: when an autonomous system acts on a business's behalf, nothing in the stack can prove what happened, under whose authority, from what evidence — in a form a third party can check.
The architecture. Proof Mode inserts one hop: the gate evaluates each claim before the tool executes, and seals the outcome — allowed or not — into an append-only receipt chain.
| Mode | How it works | Fits |
|---|---|---|
| SDK wrap | The agent runtime calls gate.evaluate(claim) before each tool dispatch — a few lines at the tool-router layer. | Custom agent stacks, voice platforms |
| Gateway proxy | Tool traffic routes through a policy-enforcing proxy; agents need zero code changes. | Platforms with a central tool bus / MCP-style tool servers |
| Webhook gate | The platform posts each pending action to /v1/evaluate and honors the verdict. | Process-automation & orchestration platforms, CI/CD |
# the entire integration surface, in one call — production shape POST https://decrec.summitcognitive.ai/v1/evaluate { "claim": "Charge $180.00 deposit to card-on-file for WO#4417", "entity": "alpine-peak/payments", "agent": { "id": "PAY-1", "runtime": "voice-stack" }, "tool": { "name": "payments.charge", "args_sha256": "9c41…" }, "sources": [ { "type": "call_transcript", "digest": "b7d2…" } ] } # → verdict: ACCEPTED | ESCALATED | BLOCKED + sealed, chain-linked receipt
Policy is configuration, not code. Autonomy caps, data-scope boundaries, approver lists, and confidence floors are set with the workflow owner on day one — and every rule evaluation is itself recorded in the receipt, so “the policy fired” is provable, not asserted.
| Rule | What it enforces | Catches, e.g. |
|---|---|---|
| R1 identity & decision rights | The actor is verified and holds the right to make this decision on this entity. | Caller fails two-factor identity match → write blocked |
| R2 source diversity | Consequential actions cite ≥ N independent evidence sources. | A charge justified only by the agent's own summary |
| R3 provenance integrity | Every cited source carries a digest; inputs are content-addressed. | Evidence edited after the fact |
| R4 confidence threshold | Model confidence below the floor cannot authorize a write. | Mumbled 8 vs 18 on a call → escalate, don't guess |
| R5 autonomy cap | Value/action ceilings for autonomous execution; above → human approval. | $180 charge vs $100 cap → escalated with evidence |
| R6 data scope & sensitivity | Restricted categories (health, raw card data, gov ID) are unwritable by this agent. | “My husband is on home oxygen” never enters the CRM |
| R7 blast-radius bounds | Rate and scope limits: one call can't touch a thousand records. | Runaway loop mass-updating the calendar |
| R8 replay determinism | The decision must be re-derivable from recorded inputs alone. | “It seemed right at the time” as a defense |
| R9 attestation & chain integrity | The receipt seals into the chain; production adds Ed25519 signatures. | Quietly deleting the embarrassing action |
Every field exists to answer an auditor's question: who acted, on what authority, from what evidence, with what outcome — and how do I know this record is the original?
Press start. A seeded generator produces synthetic operational scenarios — bookings, reschedules, payment collections, refunds, after-hours dispatches, and attempted policy violations. Scripted actor labels route those events through browser-only JavaScript functions that update the in-memory panels below. Watch the synthetic state and receipt chain change. Change the seed for a different scenario sequence; keep it for a bit-identical one. This demonstrates deterministic policy and hashing mechanics, not autonomous-agent or external-tool execution.
A control you can't test is a promise. Everything here operates on the chain sealed above — recomputing real hashes, in your browser, with no Summit service in the loop.
Recompute every receipt hash from contents; confirm each link points to its predecessor.
Rewrite history — change any sealed field. The chain breaks at that receipt and everything downstream becomes unprovable.
The whole chain as portable JSON. This file is the audit artifact — anyone can re-verify it with ~15 lines of code in any language.
# independent verifier — no Summit code required for r in ledger: assert sha256(canonical(r minus hash)) == r.hash assert r.prev == previous.hash
The question always comes later — a chargeback, a complaint, a regulator, a discovery request. Query the ledger you sealed above like an auditor would: filter to the action, open its dossier, walk its evidence chain, and replay the decision from recorded inputs to prove the system would decide the same way again.
Proof Mode is infrastructure, not an app: it sits between “the agent decided” and “the system did,” wherever that seam exists. The sandbox above is a service-business voice workflow — the same gate-and-seal pattern applies unchanged across:
Bookings, CRM writes, payments taken on calls — the adoption blocker is defensibility; receipts remove it.
Agentic steps inside regulated business processes get per-action verdicts and audit-ready evidence — the artifact compliance teams currently ask for and don't get.
Multi-agent systems with tool access at scale: autonomy caps, blast-radius bounds, and one chain of custody across all of them.
The live production system gating autonomous code-change decisions today — see the ledger link below.
Receipts are evidence artifacts, mappable to the controls your customers already audit against: change-management and logging controls in SOC 2 and ISO 27001, the govern/map/measure functions of the NIST AI RMF, and record-keeping, human-oversight and traceability obligations for high-risk systems under the EU AI Act. The pilot's verification pack includes the control mapping for the instrumented workflow.